ful valuation of Conference literature is constantly hampered by the difficulty of appreciating perspective. He must know why it is not necessary to "gcj'ap the treaty" because the reparation section is not, and was never meant to be, feasible; why Great Britain and the United States gave way to France over the admission of Germany t0 •the League and the exclusion of German Austria from a Teutonic confederation; why President Wilson did one thing at Fiume and another at Shautu'ng; why he insisted on the Covenant preceding and being incorporated in the treaties; why "open covenants openly arrived at" were after all born in his private apartment--and so on. Two composite works which attempt to give this wider view far outweigh the contributions hitherto mentioned. Each of. these symposia has an unusual history. What Really Happened at Paris • is an all-American production. Under the direction of,ColoBel House, the Public Ledger has conducted in Philadelphia during the past winter a "forum on the peace conference." Befo?e ira dqgen of the leading figures of the House Commission delivered papers which were publisked verbatim at the time and are now appearing in book form. Varying in quality and breadth of vision, these addresses all contain much authoritative information.
The best of them are coincerned neither with making sensational revelati6ns nor with developing the thesis that this or that personality or delegation monopolized wisdom. Occasionally, perhaps inevitably, the writer catches the atmosphere cif h{'s original audience and panders for a moment to the slight self-cbnsciousness naturally characteristic of our North American communities that have had so little experience in international affairs, or to the general tendency on this side of the Atlantic to associate great matters with perso,nal considerations. Thus Mr. Gompers can hardly be taken too seriously when he not only claims that "American labor wrote into the labor section the heart anc[soul of that section," but goes off to say that "what others were able to do was to soil in some measure the garb, the expression."2 He ignores the known fact that the Commission for Labour Legislation was only saved from the dilemma of preparing impossible projects, in a Treaty which was supposed to be final, ,by the scheme for reconciling the functions of national legislative The • "The attitude of Brockdorff-Rantzau damaged the legend that Germany was a regenerated and repentant democracy" (Temperley, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 2). ever these exports go, they must necessarily be 'sold somewhat under the established market.
It is not to be believed that • "Nothing has happened that has lifted that reponsibility from the place where from the beginning it has rested. It is a hard thing to be patient with men who point to the economic dissolution war has wrought and say, 'There are the fruits of your peace'" (Young, loc. cit., p. 317).
Germany
• The. British knew just what they wanted and how to get it. In training and experience they were second to no other delegation, and worked with a sureness of touc•h that aroused the deepest • Dr. Young's admirable statement of the necessity of give and take at Paris disarms a large proportion of the hostile criticism that has been directed against the negotiations (loc. cit., chapter xii).
• press, the Chamber of D,epu•ies, and the French voters . When the issue was pressed, the sound and fury of them seemed to be cherished even more than their effective content.
The French government at that time was riding on,the surface of a perilous sea ot popular feeling. The ship had to be steered according to t'•e waves and the wind, regardless sometimes of the true direction of
